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In the Supren1e Court of the 
State of Utah 
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPO-
RATION, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 8635 
Brief of Farmers and Merchants Bank, 
a Corporation 
STATE.MENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The statement of appellant in its brief is confined to 
the evidence and facts which tend to sustain its claim, and 
fails to refer to the evidence which support the claim of 
the Bank. It, therefore, becomes necessary for respondent 
Bank to direct the attention of the Court to the evidence 
which supports its claim. 
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Before doing so, however, we direct the Court to what 
was decided on the former appeal of this case. We quote 
the follqwing from the opinion of the Court on the former 
appeal: 
''However, one of the allegations of the complaint in this 
action stated that at the time checks were presented 
to the bank for payment to C.I.T., that corporation 
kne·w Oi' should have known that the only source from 
which said checks could be paid was credit given to 
Parsley for the drafts which the corporation later re-
fused to honor. No specific finding was made by the 
trial court on this matter; although the Court did make 
the finding that the checks were paid in reliance on the 
assurances of C.I.T. personnel that the drafts would 
be paid and a general finding of issues not specifically 
mentioned in plaintiff's favor. If the payee of a check 
has knowledge that there are no funds on deposit to 
meet it, and the bank pays the check in ignorance of 
that fact, there may be a recovery of the payment. 
Peterson v. Union National Bank, 52 Pac. 206; 91 Am. 
Dec. 146. Since the judgment was rendered on the 
basis of outstanding drafts, rather than the checks 
whose payment was wrongfully induced by appellant, 
this case must be reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings.'' 
It is further said: 
"A great deal of argument is devoted to the question 
of whether or not the bank intended to accept the $21,-
. 000 note as payment from Parsley, thus discharging 
appellant from obligation. However, the trial court 
found that there was no agreement to that effect and 
the finding is supported by competent evidence. In 
the absence of such an agreement, the rule as set out 
in 40 Am. Jur., Payment, Sec. 87 is: 'The general rule 
is that a note given by a debtor for a precedent debt 
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. will not be held to extinguish that debt, in the absence 
of an agreement to that effect, but will be considered 
. as conditional payment or as collateral security, or as 
an acknowledgment or memorandum of the amount 
ascertained to be due. The doctrine proceeds on the 
obvious ground that nothing can be justly considered 
as payment in fact but that which is in truth such, un-
less something else is e~pressly agreed to be received 
in its place. That a mere promise to pay cannot of itself 
be regarded as an effective payment is manifest.' " 
The Mandate of the Court on the former appeal is: 
"Reversed and remanded for further determination not 
inconsistent with this opinion and, if deemed necessary, 
for the taking of additional evidence." 
In order to avo1d unnecessary repetition we shall direct 
the attention of the Court to the· evidence which sustains 
the claim of the Bank in connection with the various points 
upon which it relies for the relief sought by it. The Points 
relied upon by the Bank in support of its claim for a judg-
ment against the appellant C.I.T. for the swn of $21,431.08, 
together with interest thereon from and after January 7, 
1953, at 6% per annum, are: 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE NOW BEFORE THE COURT ON 
THIS APPEAL IS NOT ONLY AS STRONG BUT 
STRONGER IN SUPPORT OF THE CLAIM 0'F THE 
BANK THAN WAS THE EVIDENCE O·N THE FORMER 
APPEAL, AND, THJEREFORE, THE DOCTRINE OF 
"TilE LAW OF THE CASE" REQUIRE·S A JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE BANK FOR THE AMOUNT IT PAID 
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ON .. TIIE CHECKS DRAWN BY PARSLEY, INC., IN FA-
V!OR OF DEFENDANT C.I.T. WinCH WERE PAID IN 
RELIANCE UPO·N THE DRAFTS WIDCH WERE DIS-
HONORED AND FOR WIDCH PARSLEY WAS GIVEN 
CREDIT. 
POINT 'IWO 
DEFENDANT UNIVERSAL C.LT. CREDIT CORPO-
RATION KNEW THAT PARSLEY, INC., WAS WITH-
OUT FUNDS ON DEPOSIT IN THE PLAINTIFF BANK 
TO PAY THE CHECKS IN THE SUM OF $24,668.03, TIIE 
S~ BEING EXIDBITS X TO GG. 
. POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT KNOW AND IS NOT 
CHARGEABLE WITH 'KNOWLEDGE THIAT PARSLEY, 
INC. DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUNDS ON DEPOSIT 
TO PAY THE PARSLEY, INC. CHECKS EXHIBITS X 
THROUGH GG. 
POINT FOUR 
THlE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT REQUIRE THAT THE SUM OF $3554.27 MAY 
NOT LAWFULLY BE DEDUCTED FROM THE $24,668.03 
WIDCH THE BANK PAID THE .C.I.T. ON THE CHECKS 
DRAWN BY PARSLEY, INC., IN FAVOR OF C.I.T. AND 
PAID BY THE BANK IN RELIANCE UPON THE CRE-
DIT GIVEN PARSLEY FOR THE FOUR DISf:IONORED 
DRAFTS. 
POINT FIVE 
TH1E TRI.A:L COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FINDING 
THAT THE BANK IMPOUNDED FROM THE ACCOUNT 
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OF PARSLEY, INC., THE SUM OF $7792.57, OR ANY 
OTHER SUM, AND THEREFORE ERRED IN AMEND-
ING THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND IN DEDUCf-
ING FROM THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT THE 
SUM OF $7792.57, OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT. 
It will be seen that the foregoing Points One, Two and 
Three are calculated as an answer to the argument con-
tained in Appellant's Brief, and that Points Four and Five 
are direc~ed to the matters which the Bank raises by its 
Cross-Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE NOW BEFORE THE COURT ON 
TillS APPEAL IS NOT ONLY AS STRONG BUT 
STRONGER -IN SUPPORT O,F THE CLAIM OF THE 
BANK THAN WAS THE EVIDEN·CE ON THE F1C)RMER 
APPEAL, AND, THEREFORE, THE DOCTRINE _OF 
''THE LAW O~F THE CASE'' REQUIRES A JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE BANK FOR THE AMOUNT IT PAID 
ON THE CHECK·S D1RAWN BY PARS-LEY, INC., IN FA-
VOR OF DEFEND.ANT C.I.T. WHICH WERE PAID IN 
RELIANCE UPON THE !DRAFTS WHICH WERE DIS-
HONORED AND F10R WHICH PARSLEY WAS GIVEN 
CREDIT. 
It is the settled law in this and other jurisdictions that 
when a court of last resort has decided a question of law 
or fact: such decision becomes the "law of the case" and as 
such is binding on future appeals of the same cause. The 
law in such particular is thus stated in 3 Am. Jur., page 541, 
Sec. 985: 
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"It. may be stated generally that a court of review is 
precluded from agitating questions which were pro-
pounded, ·considered and decided on a previous review. 
The decisions agree as a general rule, when an appel-
late court passes upon a question and remands the cause 
for further proceedings, the question thus settled be-
comes the 'law of thle case' upon a subsequent appeal, 
provided the same facts and issues were determined in 
the previous appeal are involved in the second appeal", 
etc. 
In a footnote to the text will be foWld citation of cases 
from the United States Supreme Court and other Federal 
courts and from most of the courts of last resort of the 
various states of the Union, including the case of Grand 
Cent. Min. Co. v. Mammouth Min. Co., 36 Utah 364, 104 
Pac. 573, Ann. Cases 1912 A 254. 
It will be noted from the above quotations from the 
former appeal of this case that the Court remanded the 
case for further proceedings with directions that the Court 
may dispose of the case on the evidence taken at the former 
hearing, or if the trial court so concluded, the Court may 
take additional evidence. The trial court re-opened the 
case and additional evidence was offered and received. As 
we shall presently point out, the additional evidence which 
was received all tended to strengthen the claim of plaintiff. 
That being so, the doctrine of the "la\v of the case" is es-
pecially applicable here. If the evidence before the Court 
on the former appeal required a finding and judgment one 
way or the other, it would have been idle to have remanded 
the case to the trial court with directions to dispose of the 
case on the evidence before it on the former appeal, or if 
it were so adversed to receive additional evidence. On the 
contrary, if the evidence taken at the fonner hearing re-
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quired a finding and judgment as. contended by the C.I.T. 
ih its brief on this appeal, this· Court would have so decided. 
Having failed to do so it necessarily follows that. the evi-
dence taken at the former hearing is sufficient to support 
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT UNIVERS.AL C.I.T. CREDIT CORPO-
RATIO·N KNEW THAT PARSLEY, INC., WAS WITH-
OUT·FU·NDS.ON DEPOSIT IN THE PLAINTIFF BANK 
TO PAY THE CHECKS IN THE SUM OF $24,668.03, THE 
SAME BEING EXIDBITS X TO GG. 
In considering this case as to whether or not the evi-
dence supports the finding of the trial court to the effect 
that defendant C.I.T. knew that Parsley, Inc., was without 
funds on deposit at plaintiff Bank with which to pay the 
checks here involved, it is necessary to keep in mind not 
only the doctrine of the "law of the case" diSCl.LSSed in Point 
One of this Brief, but also the fact that this is an action at 
law and not a suit in equity. It is, of eourse, elementary 
in this and other jurisdictions that appellate courts do not 
pass upon the weight of the evidence in an action at law. 
Article 8, Section 9, of the Constitution of Utah in part pro-
vides: 
"That an appeal to the Supreme Court in equity cases 
shall be on both question of law and fact. In cases at 
law the appeal shall be on question of law alone." 
Among the numerous cases in this jurisdiction where 
it is held that this Court will not and may not disturb the 
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findings of the trial judge or the jury as to facts which are 
supported by substantial evidence are: 
Lyman v. Town of Price, 63 Utah 90, 222 Pac. 599. 
Osborn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 Pac. 435. 
In re Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 Pac. (2d) 
432. 
Sine v. Salt Lake Trans. Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 Pac. 
(2d) 878. 
Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 Pac. (2d) 592. 
Among the findings of fact made by the trial court in 
this case are the following: 
"9. That during the latter part of December, 1952, 
and the first part of January, 1953, the above 
mentioned Harry Parsley, Inc., drew a large num-
ber of checks, the total of which checks were in 
excess of $30,000.00. That such checks were 
drawn on the plaintiff bank and were made pay-
able to the order of· the defendant corporation 
herein. That on January 6, 1953, the defendant 
corporation presented ten checks in the total 
amount of $24,668.03 to the plaintiff for paymen~ 
and the plaintiff paid such checks and charged the 
amount thereof against the credit of Harry Pars-
ley, Inc. 
"10. That at the time such checks were presented to 
the plaintiff for payment the only source from 
which such checks could or would be paid was the 
credit given Harry Parsley, Inc., for the sight 
drafts drawn by it on the defendant Corporation 
as heretofore found in these findings and said de-
fendant knew such to be the same. 
"11. That on January 6, 1953, a Mr. McConnell, an 
agent and officer of the defendant Corporation 
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9 
told the Cashier of plaintiff bank that the defend-
ant Corporation would honor and pay all drafts 
drawn against it by Harry Parsley, Inc., that were 
in course of being processed up to and including 
the close of business on January 6, 1953, but not 
to honor any drafts after that date unless specifi-
cally authorized to do so. 
"12. That on January 7, 1953, at aJbout 10 o'clock a. 
m., Clyde B. Sperry, Branch Manager of defend-
ant Corporation, and Mr. McConnell, an officer 
and agent of the defendant Corporation came to 
the bank of plaintiff at Provo, Utah, and then and 
there told the officers of plaintiff bank that the 
drafts drawn by Harry Parsley, Inc., involved in 
this litigation would be paid (Tr. 106). 
"13. That on January 7, 1953, at about 4:30 o'clock 
p. m., defendant W. A. Wilkenson, while acting 
as agent for the defendant Corporation, came to 
the bank at Provo, U·tah·, and then and there in-
formed the plaintiff bank that he, Wilkinson, had 
ordered all of the above mentioned drafts:· paid 
and thereby intended to and did induce the plain-
tiff bank to believe that such drafts had been or 
would be honored and paid by defendant Corpo-
ration. 
"14. That in reliance upon the agreement had by and 
between Harry PaTsley, Inc., and the plaintiff and 
defendant Corporation, together wirth the state-
ments and assurances made by the personal rep-
resentatives, defendants Francis J. Nichols and 
W. A. Wilkenson, and by McConnell and Sperry, 
.agents and employees of defendant Corporation, 
to the plaintiff bank as herein found, the plaintiff 
gave immediate credit to Harry Parsley, Inc., for 
the drafts presented to plaintiff on Janua·ry 6, 
1953, and when on January 6, 1953, defendant 
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Corporation presented the checks in its favor 
drawn on plaintiff bank by said Harry Parsley, 
Inc., the plaintiff bank honored and paid such 
checks, and in further reliance upon the assurance 
of W. A. Wilkenson that said drafts above men-
tioned had been or would be honored and .paid, 
the plaintiff took no steps to protect itself from its 
having paid to the defendant Corporation the 
checks above mentioned un·til after defendant Cor-
poration on January 8, 1953, refused to honor or 
pay any of the drafts drawn by Harry Parsley, 
Inc., and for which it had been given credit as 
hereinbefore found. (Tr. 107) 
"16. That the plaintiff corporation did not open the 
sight drafts containing the contracts that were 
presented to it by Hlarry Parsley, Inc., as herein-
before found until the same were returned to it, 
but its officers and agents did open the envelopes 
containing the sight drafts upon the return there-
of to the plaintiff on January 10, 1953. 
"17. That when the defendant Corporation refused to 
honor and pay the above mentioned sight drafts 
in the total sum of $29,223.65, the plaintiff charged 
back against the account of Harry Parsley, Inc., 
the sum of $7792.57, that being the amount of 
credit given by the plaintiff bank to Harry Pars-
ley, Inc., over and above the amount that was 
charged against said account of Harry Parsley, 
Inc., by reason of the plaintiff having honored and 
paid the checks above mentioned which were 
drawn against the checking account by Harry 
Parsley, Inc., in favor of the defendant Corpora-
tion and honored and paid by the plaintiff as here-
inbefore found. 
"20. The Court finds by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence that the defendant herein had knowledge 
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that there were no funds on deposit to meet the 
checks so presented and the Farmers and · Mer-
·chants Bank paid the checks in ignorance of the 
f.act that there were no funds to pay such checks 
in that when the credit represented by the sight 
drafts above mentioned was cancelled because the 
sight drafts were not honored, there was no other 
source or funds with which rto pay the above men-
tioned checks, ExhibirtJs X, Y, Z, AA·, BB, CC, DD, 
EE, FF, and GG". (Tr. 109) 
Unless the foregoing Findings are without support in 
the evidence, it may not be said that the defendant Oovpo-
ration was without knowledge that Parsley, Inc., did not 
have funds on deposit in the plaintiff bank to pay the 
checks above mentioned, if and when the sight drafts were 
dishonored. Merely because there is a eonfliet in the evi-
dence or that the members m this Court would not have 
made such findings, cannot aid the appellant Corporation. 
The -evidence offered and received by the trial court 
at the hearing had before the case was before this Court on 
the former hearing and the evidence offered and received 
arfiter the case was remanded to the court below are brought 
here on this appeal. In the brief filed by appellant, C.I.T., 
the attention of the Court has apparently been directed to 
all of the evidence which is claimed to suppo~t the conten-
tion of the C.I.T. to the effect thart it should be relieved from 
all liability by reason of the transactions which constitute 
the subject matter of this conrtro¥ersy. 
The evidence showing that defendant C.I.T. knew thart 
the checks above mentioned must be paid, if at all, from 
the credit given to Parsley, Inc., from the dishonored drafts 
is not referred to in the brief heretofore filed on behalf of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.12 
appellant C.I.T. We shall, therefore, direct the attention of 
the Court to the evidence which supports the finding of the 
trial court that the C.I.T. had knowledge that there were 
no funds on deposit to meet the checks above mentioned. 
On or about October 1, 1952, an arrangement-was had by 
Parsley, Inc., defendant C.I.T. and the plaintiff Bank where-
by Parsley, Inc., should draw sight drafts on the C.I.T. and 
receive immediate credit therefor. It is so alleged in para-
graph 4 of the Amended Complaint, (R.. 10), and admitted 
in the Answer and Counterclaim of the defendants (R. 17). 
It is also so found by the trial court (R. 60). 
That arrangement was carried out until December 23, 
1952. On that day, Mr. Nichol, Manager of the office of 
C.I.T. at Salt Lake City , ca.Iled on the telephone Mr. Cal-
der, Cashier and Vice-President of plaintiff Bank, and a 
conversation was had with respect to the method of giving 
immediate credit to Parsley, Inc., for sight drafts drawn on 
the C.I.T. In that conversation both Mr. Calder and Mr. 
Nichol indicated that they would prefer to handle the drafts 
of Parsley, Inc., on the basis of collecting the amount of the 
drafts rather than the basis of giving immediate credit 
However, it was agreed that the method of giving immedi-
ate credit for the sight drafts of Parsley, Inc., would be con-
tinued (Tr. One, pages 8-9). (NOTE: As heretofore 
stated, there are two transcripts, one of the first and one 
of the second hearings. To avoid confusion, we shall, in 
this brief, refer to the transcript of the first hearing as "Tr. 
One", and of the second hearing as "Tr. Two", and indicate 
by figures the pages where the evidence may be found). 
During the conversation had on December 23rd, 1952. 
the financial standing of Parsley, Inc., was also discussed, 
at which time Mr. Nichol stated that they had a :fmancial 
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statement in which it appeared that Parsley, ·Inc., had made 
a profit in a short period of $90,000.00, and that while Pars-
ley was somewhat over-extended and short on working capi-
tal, they believed he was sound (T,r. One, 10) (See also evi-
dence of Mr. Nichol, Tr. One, 211). 
On the next day, December 24, 1952, Mr. Ni-chol again 
called Mr. Calder on long distance telephone and a conver-
sation was had by them concerning the drafts which the 
Bank was giving Parsley immediate credit for. At that 
conversation Mr. Nichol staJted that the C.I.T. had placed 
a limit on the wholesale financing of Parsley, Inc., and that 
it, Parsley, Inc., had exceeded the limit, and that the Bank 
should not give immediate credit for any more sight drafts 
fror wholesale transactions (Tr. One, 13-15). There is a con-
·ruct in the evidence as to what was said about how whole-
sale contracts could be ascertained. Mr. Calder testified 
that Mr. Nichol stated that wholesale drafts were in even 
sums .of $1000.00 or round figures, like $6000.00, $8000.00, 
or $10,000.00, whereas a retail sum had a figure in every 
digit, dollars and cents (Tr. One, 14-15). Mr. Nichol stated 
that he merely stated that drafts given in a wholesale tran-
saction were for a greater amount than for retail transac-
tions, and that one could not tell from the face of ·a draft 
whether it represented a retail or a wholesale transaction 
(Tr. One, 213). We digress to observe that this phase of 
the case was discussed at considerable length in the briefs 
filed on the former appeal. In light of the issues presently 
before the Court no useful purpose would be served by a 
further discussion of that phase of the case. If the Court 
should still be interested in that phase of the case, the dis-
cussion had with respect thereto on behalf of the Bank will 
be found in its brief on the former hearing under Point Two, 
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page 20, and Point Three, page 25. The attention of the 
Court is ealled to the fact that the sight drafts here involved 
were writen on the outside of an envelope which was sealed, 
and which contained a notation on the top thereof: "Please 
seal this envelope." Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is the form of the 
draft used. 
On January 6, 1953, thirteen sight drafts drawn on the 
defendant corporation for the total sum of $29,223.65 were 
delivered to the plaintiff by Parsley, Inc., and immediate 
credit given to Parsley, Inc., account on January 6, 1953. 
These sight drafts were sent to plaintiff's correspondent 
bank, Walker Bank and Trust Company, on January 7, 1953, 
and presented for payment through the First Security Bank 
of Utah on January 8, 1953. All of these drafts were dis-
honored and payment refused. The drafts were returned 
to the Bank on J~nuary 10, 1953 (Tr. One, 23 to 34). The 
trial court so found at the conclusion of the first hearing, 
(R. 61 and 63), and also at the conclusion of the second 
hearing (R. 105 and 108). No complaint is made of such 
Findings. 
Mr. Calder testified that on January 6, 1953, Mr. Mc-
Connell, an offi·cer or agent of the defendant C.I.T., called 
Mr. Calder on long distance telephone and told Mr. Calder 
not to give any more immediate credit to any drafts that 
Parsley, Inc., may draw on defendant C.I.T., but that C.I.T. 
would honor the drafts that \\·ere presented up to and in-
cluding January 6, 1953. Such conversation was had after 
the drafts here involved \vere credited to Parsley's account 
(Tr. One, 51 and 52). This testimony is not denied. 
Mr. T. M. Simmons testified that he is the Assistant 
Manager of the Federal Reserve Bank at Salt Lake City 
(Tr. T\VO, 7). That the Federal Reserve Bank acts as a 
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clearing house for the banks of Utah that are ~tside of 
Salt Lake City, which includes the First Securit~ Bank in 
Salt Lake City, the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Provo~ 
and the Walker Bank and Trust. Company of Salt Lake City; 
that there are regulations in respect to checks of $1000.00 
or more in case the same are not paid (Tr. Two, 8). That 
stamps are placed on checks when the same are endorsed. 
From such stamps the bank making the endorsement can 
be ascertained. Thart check No. 3798, darted January 2, 
1953, for $35.68.78 is drawn by Harry Parsley, Inc., in favor 
of Universal C.I.T. as payee (Tr. Two, 9). That on Janu-
ary 8, (1953) Miss Walker at the Main and First South 
Branch of the First Security Bank of Utah, Salt Lake City, 
was notified by telephone that an item for $3568.78 was 
coming back unpaid (T~. Two, 16). Counsel for defendant 
C.I.T. stated thalt there was no doubt that everyone knew 
on January 8, 1953, that the checks m Parsley, Inc., were 
no good (Tr. Two, 19). That notiee was sent to the agent, 
that is, the First Security Bank· on January 8th that check 
No. 3798 had fbeen returned wirth payment stopped. Similar 
evidence was offered ·and received as to check No. 3797, 
which is dated January 2, 1953, drawn by Parsley, Inc., in 
favor of C.I.T. for $4435.00 (Tr. Two, 21). That check No. 
3792, dated January 2, 1953, drawn by Parsley, Inc., in fa-
vor of C.I.T. ~or $1350.00 is marked "Payment stopped." 
This eheck bears endorsement of Main and First South 
Branch, }qrst Security Bank of Utah on J'anuary 5, 1953, 
and the endorsement of the Farmers and Merchants Bank 
on January 7, 1953, which check got back to the Federal 
Reserve Bank on January 8, 19'53. Miss Walker was also 
notified rthat check had been returned (Tr. Two, 23). That 
the maker of the check No. 3789 for $4150.00, dated De-
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cember 31, 1952, is Harry Parsley, Inc., and C.I.T. Coopo-
ration is the payee. It bears a notation in pencil "Refer to 
Maker". It bears endorsement J~uary 3, 1953 (Tr. Two, 
25). That on January 6rth theFederal Reserve Bank re-
~eiveq telegraphic advice that the aJbove mentioned check 
for $4150.00 was being returned. That on January 7th Miss 
W ~ker of the First Security Bank was notified ~hat such 
check was being returned. She was so notified by tele-
phone (Tr. Two, 26). 
· That check No. 3753 for $2608.24, dated ~mber 30, 
1952, is made out by Harry Parsley, Inc., and payable to 
Universal C.I.T. It is marked on the front "Payment 
stopped". It bears endorsement January 5, 1953, and the 
stamp of the Ftarmers and Merchants Bank is on the check 
as of January 7, 1953. It was received back unpaid on Jan-
uary 8th, and the Universal. C.I.T. or the First Security 
Bank was notified by telephone on January 8th that the 
check had been returned unpaid (Tr. Two, 27). 
That check No. 3750 bearing date December 30, 1952, 
for $1350.00 is drawn by Harry Parsley, Inc., in favor 
of ·Universal C.I.T. ·and is marked in red ink "Payment 
stopped". Lt bears the endorsement of the First SeCurity 
Bank as of January 5, 1953, and by the Farmers and Mer-
chants Bank as of January 7, 1953; that by a telegram of 
January 7, 1953, received by the Federal Reserve Bank on 
the morning of January 8, 1953, the Federal Reserve Bank 
vlas notified that the check was being returned unpaid (~. 
Two, 28). That Miss Walker at the First Security Bank 
was notified that the check was being returned. 
That check No. 3741, dated December 29, 1952, shows 
Harry Parsley, Inc., as maker and Universal C.I.T. as the 
payee. It is for $2687.77. It bears the endorsement of 
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First Security Bank on January 3, 1953, and of the Far-
mers and Merchants Bank on January 5, 1953. It was re-
ceived back from the Farmers and Merchants Bank on Jan-
uary 7, 1953 (~r. Two, 29). The Farmers and Merchants 
Bank sent a telegram dated January 6, 1953, and on the 
morning of January 7, 1953, Miss Walker was again noti-
fied of the non-payment of that check; that Hlarry Parsley, 
Inc., is the maker and C.I.T. is the payee of check dated 
December 22, 1952, for the sum of $249·5.00. It has marked 
on the front "Drawn on uncollected funds" in pencil. It 
bears the endorsement of the First Security Bank on Janu-
ary 2, 1953, and of the· Farmers and Merchants Bank on 
January 3, 1953 (Tr. Two, 30). That a telegram dated 
January 5, 1953, was received at 9:02 o'clock a.m. by the 
Federal Reserve Bank stating that rtJhe above check was be-
ing returned; that Miss Walker at the Bank was notified 
on January 6, 1953, that the check was being returned un-
paid (Tr. Two, 31) . 
That ·Check No. 3729 dated December 27, 1952, for 
$2127.97 is drawn by Harry Parsley as maker in favor of 
Universal ·C.I.T. as payee. There is written on the face of 
the check "Refer to Maker". It was endorsed fby the Flrst 
Security Bank on January 3, 1953, and by the Farmers and 
Merchants Bank on a date that cannot be readilly deter-
mined (Tr. Two, 32). That at 5:05 p. m. on January 6th 
a telegram was received from the Farmers and Merchants 
Bank stating that the above ·check was being returned, and 
Miss Walker of the First Security Bank was notified that 
said check was being returned on January 7th. That the 
notification from the Farmers and Merchants Bank that the 
foregoing ~checks were being returned was in accordance 
with the rule that au· -checks over $1000.00 that were dis-
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honored should be immediately given (Tr. Two, 33). 
Mr. Calder testified at the second hearing in part as 
follows: 
That the check No. 2515 darted January 7, 1953, made 
by C.I.T. as maker to Parsley, Inc., as payee for $2581.87 
was deposited at plaintiff Bank on January 8th and credited 
to the account of Parsley. Payment of the check was re-
fused by ~C.l.T. and returned to tbe plaintiff Bank and 
charged back against the Parsley account on January 10, 
1953 (Tr. Two, 37). 
Mr. Calder was crossexamined and re-examined at con-
siderable length (See Tr. Two, pages 37 to 60, both inclu-
sive) , but we refrain from abstracting such testimony be-
cause we can find nothing therein that sheds any light on 
the questions which were by this Court submitted to ,fue 
trial court by the opinion written on the first appeal. More-
over, as heretofore stated, apparently all evidence which 
C.I.T. claims is favorable to it is called to the attention of 
the Court in its brief. 
Victor J. Bird was called by plaintiff Bank and in sub-
stance testified: 
Thart he is a member of the Executive Committee of the 
Utah Bankers Committee, and is familiar with the proced-
ure followed by banks in Utah of giving immediate notice 
when items in excess of $1000.00 are returned to the de-
positor (Tr. '1\vo, 61). 
Mrs. Jo Ann Johnston was called by C.I.T. as its wit-
ness. It is made to appear that she had been in the employ 
of Parsley, Inc.; that she took sight drafts drawn by Parsley, 
Inc., on C.I.T. and deposited the same at plaintiff Bank, 
and at times took drafts directly to C.I.T. at Salt Lake for 
its payment or approval. We can find nothing in her testi-
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here presented. Her testimony will be found in Tr. Two, 
pages 90 to 99, both inclusive. 
Mr. Clyde B. ·SpeiTy was called as a witness by ·C.I.T. 
He testified that he was the Manager at Salt Lake ~City for 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation during the monrths of 
October, November and December, 19'5·2, and January, 1953. 
That he is familiar ·With the m·anner employed in the financ-
ing of Harry Parsley. That the bulk of such financing was 
done by the use of sight drafts; that Mr. Parsley drew 
drafts through his depository bank on Universal C.I.T. for 
wholesale and retail transactions, and the C.I.T. would ac-
cept them through its bank (Tr. Two, 101). That in most 
cases there would be a check drawn in favor of C.I.T. in the 
envelopes upon which was written the sight drafts; most 
of. such checks contained the same date as the sighrt draft 
(Tr. Two, 102). 
Mr. Sperry was shown a deposit slip marked defend-
ant's Exhibit 8, and his attention ·called to a number of items 
therein which he testified were items paid by HarTy Pars-
ley for money due to C.I.T. (Tr. 104). After some di'scus.-
sion defendant's Exhibit 8 was received in evidence (Tr. 
Two, 107). E~hi-bit 9 was received in evidence afiter evi-
dence was offered showing that it contained, amQng other 
items, checks made by Parsley, Inc., to C.I.T. (Tr. Two, 108-
109-112). Defendant's Exhibit 10 was offered and received 
in evidence as showing the date that ·certain checks which 
Parsley, Inc., gave to C.I.T. (Tr. Two, 120-121). The ehecks 
contained in Exhibits 8, 9 and 10 are checks that were paid 
by plaintiff Bank and for which there was no fund to pay 
the same other than the credit given for the dishonored 
drafts. Mr. Sperry further testified that nothing was done 
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to. hasten the payment of the checks which Parsley, Inc., 
gave to C.I.T. (Tr. 125). Defendant's Exhibit 9-1 was re-
ceived in evidence, (Tr. Two, 126), and Mr. Sperry testified 
that such check came back to the ·C~T. not paid, into tbe 
office of the witness on January 6, 1953, with the debit slip 
(Tr. Two, 128). Defendant's ExhiJbit 10-1 was received in 
evidence, the same being a debit slip which came back to 
the office of C.I.T. on January 7th with three checks. That 
defendant's Exhibit 10-1 was delivered by messenger to First 
Security Bank on January 7th; that Mr. Sperry was in-
formed on January 6th that the check shown in defendant's 
Exhibit 10-1 bad been dishonored (Tr. 129). That after the 
witness received such notice he directed that a list be made 
of wholesale items of cash which C.LT. had with Mr. Pars-
ley; that Mr. Sperry went with Mr. McConnell to Provo to 
check the wholesale items (Tr. Two, 130). That when he 
went to Provo he did not have any unpaid checks in his pos-
session (Tr. Two, 131). 
Mr. Calder was called as a witness by the C.I.T. and 
testified at considerable length touching the various deposits 
made by Parsley, Inc. He stated that many of such de-
posits were by sight drafts, but as to many items he did 
not know whether or not the same were sight drafts. His 
testimony while 'being examined as the witness of C.I.T. 
will be found on pages 133 to 169. We shall not abstract 
his testimony because as we view the same it does not shed 
any light on the question now before the Court. Such evi-
dence does show that Parsley, Inc., did a substantial amount 
of business in the way of making deposits and drawing 
checks against the deposits so made, and that the greater 
amount of the deposits so made were by sight drafts drawn 
on the C.I.T. Mr. Calder did repeat testimony theretofore 
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given that it was contrary to the custom of banks to give 
out information as to the condition of a customer's account 
unless authorized to do so by the depositor (Tr. Two, 169). 
Clyde B. Sperry was recalled and testified that in the 
envelopes upon which the drafts were written there were 
checks (Tr. Two, 170). That at times the C.I.T. received 
customer's payments through Harry Parsley, Inc. (Tr. Two, 
172). That it was not always that the checks received with 
the drafts were deposited immediately; that the witness was 
without knowledge concerning the checking account of Har-
ry Parsley (Tr. Two, 173). 
On cross examination Mr. Sperry testified that in the 
late afternoon of January 6, 1953, he had noticed that Check 
No. 3690 for $2495.00 had been returned unpaid (Tr. 177-
178). 
On cross examination Mr. Sperry further testified that 
the check No. 3741 for $2687.77 came back to the C.I.T. 
with a debit slip on January 7, 195·3; that check No. 3789 
in the amount of $4150.00 came 1back to C.I.T. on January 
7, 1953, with a debit slip; that check No. 3753 in the amount 
of $2608.24 came back with a debit slip to C.I.T .on Janu-
ary 8, 1953; that check No. 3760 for $1350.00 came back 
to C.I.T. on January 8, 1953 (Tr. Two, 181). That check 
No. 3792 for $1340.00 came hack to C.I.T. on January 8, 
1953, and charged to its account. That check No. 3797 in 
the amount of $4435.00 came 'back with a debit slip to C.I.T. 
on January 8, 1953. That eheck No. 3798 in the sum of 
$3568.78 came 'back to C.I.T. with a debit slip on January 
8, 1953 (Tr. Two, 182); that most of the checks shown on 
Exhibits 11 through 145 came through the Farmers and 
Merchants Bank, including the sight drafts. That Parsley 
was also doing business with Ford Motor Company; that 
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C.I.T. was financing that business, but C.I.T. paid the fac-
tory direct for new cars (Tr. 183). That the Farmers and 
Merchants Bank was told not to give Parsley immediate 
credit on sight drafts upon being informed on January 6th 
that Parsley's checks were not being paid (Tr. Two, 184). 
That when the drafts came in to C.I.T. they usually had 
security in the nature of contracts in them (Tr. Two, 185-
6). That if the drafts were paid the contracts were securi-
ty for the payment of the same (Tr. 187 -188). It will be 
noted that in the foregoing abstract of the evidence we 
have in the main confined the same to the evidence received 
at the second hearing. Being mindful of the fact that this 
Court does not look with favor on unnecessarily lengthy 
briefs, we have not attempted to again abstract all of the 
evidence received at the first hearing which may have a 
bearing on the issues which this Court indicated the court 
below should determine when the case was remanded to 
that court for further proceedings. 
If this Court should conclude to apply the doctrine of 
"the law of the case" to the record now before it, there may 
be occasion to examine the evidence received at the first 
hearing to see if any evidence was received at the second 
hearing which tends to weaken the evidence received at the 
first hearing touching the question of whether or not the 
C.I.T. knew that Parsley, Inc .. \vould be without funds to 
pay the checks which plaintiff Bank paid out of the credit 
given Parsley for the sight drafts in reliance upon the be-
lief that such drafts would be paid. If the Court should 
deem it desirable to examine at greater length the evidence 
given at the first hearing, the same is abstracted in the brief 
filed by the Bank on the former appeal at pages 1 to 18 of 
itR brief. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
To swnmarize the testimony to which we have referred 
it will be seen that the following facts are established with-
out conflict: 
1. That about O·ctober 2, 1952, an arrangement was 
had by and ·between the Universal C.I.T. Credit Corpo·ra .. 
tion, a corporation, the Harry Parsley, Inc., a eorporation, 
and the Farmers and Merchants Bank, a banking corpora .. 
tion, that Harry Parsley, Inc., may draw sight drafts in 
connection with its business in dealing in the purchase and 
sale of automobiles on the Universal C.I.T. Credit Corpo"" 
ration, and that Farmers and Merchants Bank may give 
immediate credit for the sight drafts so drawn, and the Uni-
versal C.I. T. Credit Corporation would honor and pay such 
sight drafts. 
2. That such arrangement was carried out without 
any proposed change in such method of doing business un-
til December 23, 1952. 
3. That the sight drafts were drawn on an envelope 
which contained thereon in addition to the form of a draft 
the words "Please seal this envelope"; that the envelope con-
taining the sight drafts drawn were sealed and plaintiff 
Bank sent the drafts to the C.I.T. Credit Corporation with-
out opening the same. 
4. That on December 23, 1952, Francis J. Nichols, a 
Special Sales Representative for Universal C.I.T., called by 
long distance telephone J. Hamilton Calder, Cashier and 
Vice-President of plaintiff, Farmers and Mer-chants Bank, 
and they had a talk about the financial affairs of Harry 
Parsley, Inc., and particularly about the matter of giving 
immediate credit to Parsley, Inc., for sight drafts drawn on 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation. 
5. That on December 24, 1952, Mr. Nichols again 
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called Mr. Calder on long distance telephone and told Mr. 
Calder to cease giving Parsley, Inc., immediate credit on 
wholesale deals. They also talked about how it could be 
determined when a draft was on a wholesale or when a re-
tail deal. There, however, is a conflict in the evidence as 
to what was said about the means of determining when a 
draft is for a wholesale and when a retail deal. 
6. On January 3rd, 1953, a check dated December 22, 
1952, for the sum of $2495.00 drawn by Parsley, Inc., as 
maker in favor of C.I.T. as payee was presented to the Bank; 
that on January 5, 1953, a telegram was received by the 
Fede~ral Reserve Bank stating that payment of the check 
had been refused; that on January 6, 1953, the C.LT. was 
notified that payment had been refused by plaintiff Bank 
of the above check for $2495.00. 
7. On January 6, 1953, a Mr. McConnell, an employee 
of the C.I.T., called Mr. Calder on long distance telephone 
and told him not to pay any more drafts drawn by Parsley 
on C.I.T. other than the drafts that were in process of clear-
ance on the close of business on January 6, 1953 (Tr. One, 
51) 0 
. 8. That on January 6, 1953, Parsley, Inc., drew thir-
teen sight drafts on the C.I.T., and plaintiff Bank gave im-
mediate credit for the same in the sum of $29,223.65. 
9. That on January 6, 1953, after credit was given for 
the sight drafts the follo\ving checks were presented to and 
paid or credit given by plaintiff Bank to the C.I.T., such 
checks were drawn by Parsley, Inc., in favor of C.I.T. The 
number of the Exhibit of the check, the date and the amount 
thereof are as follows: 
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Plainti,ff's Exhibit X, dated December 26, 1952, for $1979.64 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Y, dated December 22, 1952, for $3979.31 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Z, dated December 22, 1952, for $3761.43 l 
~Plaintiff's Exhibit AA, dated December 23, 1952, for $3598.55 
Plaintiff's Exhibit BB, dated December 23, 195·2., for $2321.13 
Plaintiff's Exhibit CC, dated December 26, 1952, for $2127.97 
Plaintiff's Exhibit GG, dated December .30, 1952, for $1000.00 
Plaintiff's Exhibit FF, dated December 29, 1952, for $1700.00 
Plaintiff's Exhibit EE, dated December 27, 1952, for $1165.00 
Plaintiff's Exhibit DD, dated December 31, 1952, for $3035.00 
Total $24,668.03 
10. That the following checks drawn by Parsley, Inc., 
in favor of C.I.T. as payee were presented to the plaintiff 
Bank and payment thereof refused and returned to C.I.T. 
on the following dates: 
Check No. 3690 for $2495.00 returned unpaid to C.I. T., 
Jan. 6, 1953. 
Check No. 3741 for $2687.77 returned unpaid to C.I.T., 
Jan 7, 1953. 
Check No. 3789 for $4150.00 returned unpaid to C.I.T., 
Jan 7, 1953. 
Check No. 3755 for $2608.24 returned Wlpaid to C.I.T., 
Jan. 8, 1953. 
Check No. 3750 for $1350.00 returned unpaid to C.I.T., 
Jan. 8, 1953. 
Check No. 3792 for $1350.00 returned Wlpaid to C.I.T., 
Jan. 8, 1953. 
Check No. 3797 for $4435.00 returned unpaid to C.I.T., 
Jan. 8, 1953. 
Check No. 3798 for $3568.78 returned unpaid to C.I.T., 
Jan 7, 1953. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
11. That on January 6, 1953, Mr. Sperry was informed 
that a check drawn by Parsley in favor of C.I.T. had been 
refused payment. Mr. Sperry was also informed that the 
checks which were drawn by Parsley in favor of C.I.T. and 
returned to C.I.T. on January 7, 1953, unpaid. After hav-
ing received such information Mr. Sperry and Mr. McCon-
nell, an employee of C.I.T., went to Provo. There is a con-
flict in the evidence as to the conversation had with Mr. Cal-
der of plaintiff Bank at Provo. 
12. On the afternoon of January 7, 1953, Woodrow 
A. Wilkinson, who was then the Operating Manager of C.I.T. 
Credit Corporation and stationed at Seattle, Washington, 
and in charge of operations at Seattle, Boise, Idaho Falls, 
Ogden and Salt Lake City, went to Provo, and there met 
with and had a conversation with Mr. Bird (Tr. One, 246). 
There is a confliet in the evidence as to such conversation. 
13. On January 8, 1953, G. R. McElhany, a Vice-Presi-
dent of ~.I.T. Credit Corporation, who is stationed at Se-
attle, Washington, came to Provo, and there called upon Mr. 
Calder of plaintiff Bank. Mr. McElhany had with him 
checks in excess of $20,000.00 \vhich he asked to have 
cashed. Such checks had been dra\vn by Parsley, Inc., in 
favor of C.I.T. Upon being informed that there were not 
sufficient funds to pay the checks and that Parsley had di-
rected the Bank not to pay checks in exress of $300.00, Mr. 
McElhany left the Bank and called by telephone the C.I.T. 
at Salt Lal{e C'i ty. and directed that all of the drafts held 
by the C.I.T. and dra\vn by Parsley be dishonored and pay-
ment thereon be refused (Tr. Two, 258 to 268). 
14. That on January 8, 1953, plaintiff Bank was no-
tified that the drafts dra\vn by Parsley, Inc., had been dis-
honored. 
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15. That the drafts were returned to plaintiff Bank, 
and by it received on January 10, 195·3. 
16. The evidence also shows that plaintiff Bank had 
until 8 o'clock p. m. on Janua1-y 7, 1953, in which to refuse 
payment on the checks that were drawn against the credit 
given for the sight drafts, and that plaintiff Bank would not 
have paid the checks here involved if it had known the 
drafts would be dishonored (Tr. One, 5H and 193). There is 
a conflict in the evidence as to the following conversations: 
17. As to the conversations had by Calder and Mr. 
~~ichols on December 24, 1952. 
Mr. Calder testified that Mr. Nichols stated that drafts 
given in wholesale transactions were generally in excess of 
$3000.00 and in even swns of $1000.00 in round figures like 
$6000.00, $8000.00 or $10,000.00, while drafts given in re· 
tail transactions the sum had a figure in every digit, dollars 
and cents (Tr. One, 14-15). Mr. Nichols testified that he 
told Mr. Calder that drafts given for wholesale transactions 
were generally for a. larger amount than were retail tran-
sactions (Tr. One, 210). The trial court found that Mr. 
Calder's version of the conversation is in accord with the 
facts (R. 60, paragraph 6, and on the second hearing, R-104 .. 
105, paragraph 6). 
18. As to the conversation had on January 6, 1953, 
between Mr. McConnell and Mr. C'alder over long distance 
telephone: 
Mr. Calder testified that Mr. McConnell stated that 
C.I.T. would honor the drafts that were in process of clear-
ance to the close of business on January 6, 1953 (Tr. One, 
51). Mr. McConnell did not testify. 
19. As to the conversation had on the forenoon of 
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Bank ·and Messrs. McConnell and Sperry of C.I.T.: 
Mr. Calder testified that both Mr. Sperry and Mr. Mc-
Connell stated that C.I.T. would accept sight drafts that 
were in process of clearance, but would not accept drafts 
drawn by Parsley thereafter. The testimony of Mr. Bird 
is to the same effect (Tr. One, 173). Each testified that 
they relied on the statements made and that the checks 
would not have ·been paid without assurance that the drafts 
would be honored. 
Mr. Sperry testified that on January 7, 1953, he called 
at plaintiff Bank to see if he could get a check of Parsley, 
Inc., that had been returned, certified to and that Mr. Calder 
told him no, and that any other checks that Parsley, Inc., 
may have given to C.I.T. would not be paid (Tr. Two, 227). 
That the drafts were not discussed (Tr. 228). 
20. As to the visit of Wilkenson to Provo on the aft-
ernoon of December 7, 1953: 
Mr. Bird testified that at about 4:30p.m. after closing 
hours on January 7, 1953, Mr. Wilkenson called at plaintiff 
Bank and stated that he had observed a large number of 
drafts on the desk that morning and that he had ordered 
them paid (Tr. One, 176-177). Mr. Wilkenson testified that 
he had some checks payable to Universal C.I.T. Credit Cor-
poration that had been returned unpaid, and he desired 
plaintiff Bank to certify to the checks or give a Cashier's 
check for the same, but that no mention was made of drafts 
(Tr. One, 246, 247). 
21. As to the trip of Mr. McElhany to plaintiff Bank 
at Provo. it is made to appear from his testimony: 
That he had some $20,000.00 in ~~ecks made out by 
Parsley. Inc., to the C.I.T .. and sought to have plaintiff Bank 
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pay the same, and upon the failure of plaintiff Bank to pay 
the same he directed that all of the sight drafts drawn by 
Parsley. Inc.,.on the C.I.T. be dishonored (Tr. One, 256-66). 
It was upon the evidence' so received that the trial court 
found that defendant C.I.T. Credit Corporation lmew that 
Parsley, Inc., did not have money to pay the checks here 
involved independent of the credit given Parsley, Inc., for 
the sight drafts which were dishonored by the C.I.T. 
In connection with the ·evidence offered in support of 
the claim that C.I.T. knew that there was not funds to pay 
the checks here in dispute, the attention of the Court is di-
rected to some of the adjudicated cases of this and other 
courts: 
It is held in the case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
lnv. Co., 43 Utah 181, 134 Pac. 603, that one who has an 
opportunity of knowing facts constituting an alleged fraud 
cannot be inactive and afterward allege a want of knowledge 
that arose by reason of his own laches or negligence. In 
the case of Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 5t Pac. (2d) 222, 
it is held that the means of knowledge is equivalent to 
knowledge. In Nettles v. Child, 100 Fed. 952, it is held that 
a person has actual knowledge of facts which would lead an 
ordinarily prudent man to make further investigati~n, and 
that the duty to make inquiry arises and a person is charge-
able with knowledge of facts whieh inquiry would have dis-
closed. Other cases of similar import will be found collec-
ted in footnotes to the Text in 51 C. J. S. 464, et seq. So 
also, is it the estaJblished law in many instances that facts 
may be established by circumstantial evidence because such 
evidence is frequently the only means of proving intent, 
knowledge and_fraud. 20 Am. Jur. 258-260, Sec. 270-277. 
Applying the law announced by the foregoing authori-
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ties~ how can it be 8aid that the officers of defendant corPo-·; 
ration were ignorant of. the fact that the Bank would be or 
actually was without fUnds to pay the checks here involved 
if the drafts were dishonored. From the inception of the 
arrangement whereby the defendant corporation was to 
finance Parsley, Inc., it was agreed that the Bank. should 
give immediate credit to Parsley, Inc., which could only 
mean that Parsley, Inc., was in need of immediate credit. 
As early as January 6, 1953, defendant corporation received 
notice that on the day before one of Parsley's checks made 
payable to defendant corporation had been turned down 
because of insufficient funds to pay the same. It was im-
mediately upon learning of such fact that the officers of 
defendant corporation began to make their daily trips to 
Provo to assure plaintiff Bank that all drafts drawn by Pars-
ley up to and including those drawn on January 6, 1953, 
would be honored and paid. Why should the officers and 
agent of defendant corporation on January 6, 1953, upon 
learning that one of the checks of Parsley, Inc., had been 
returned to defendant corporation, call plaintiff Bank by 
long distance telephone and inform its Cashier to cease pay-
ing drafts drawn by Parsley after that day unless defendant 
corporation knew that Parsley, Inc., was in financial dis-
tress. And more especially, why did Sperry and McConnell 
go to the Bank at Provo on January 7, 1953, and there in-
form plaintiff Bank that the drafts here involved were in 
Salt Lake and would be paid tmless it was to lull plaintiff 
Bank into the belief that it need not be concerned about 
honoring checks of Parsley. Inc., that \vere drawn against 
the sight drafts? Why did Mr. Wilkenson come from Seattle 
to Provo and inform the officers of plaintiff Bank tl:lat there 
\V(\r£' a nun1ber of drafts at Salt Lake City which he had 
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ordered paid, unless it was to induce plaintiff Bank to pay 
Parsley, Inc.'s outstanding checks? Obviously, plaintiff 
Bank had no financial interest in the matter of whether or 
not the sight drafts would be paid e~cept that the payment 
thereof was necessary to take care of the checks which the 
Bank had paid or was about to pay. 
So, also, the only reason for the officers and agents of 
the C.I.T. assuring the officers of plaintiff Bank that the 
drafts had been or would be paid was because they knew 
that the eredit given for the drafts by plaintiff was the 
source out of which the checks must be paid. 
In light of these and other facts and circumstances re-
vealed by the evidence, it may not be said that C.I.T. was 
without the means of knowing that Parsley, Inc., was with-
out funds to pay the checks, except out of the im·mediate 
credit given for the drafts, or that the C.I.T. did not have 
knowledge thereof under the doctrine announced in Salt 
Lake City v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., Taylor v. MQore, Nettles v. 
Child, and the other authorities heretofore cited in this brief. 
Surely it may not 'be said that the trial court could not, as 
it did, reasonably find such to be the fact. 
Much of what is said in the briefs of C.I.T. apparently 
proceeds on the theory that this is a suit in equity and not 
an action at law. However, it is difficult to see how it may 
be claimed that this is a suit in equity, in light of the fact 
that on the former appeal it was argued that the case 
should be reversed beeause C.I.T. was denied a jury trial. 
(See brief in case No. 8282, page 5). Notwithstanding that 
in the main the argument made on behalf of C.I.T. on their 
appeal was made on the former appeal, this Court directed 
the court below to make findings on only two questions, 
namely: Did the C.I.T. know that Parsley, Inc., was with-
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out funds to pay the ·checks in controversy, if and when the 
drafts were dishonored and refused; and did plaintiff Bank 
also know that Parsley, Inc., was without funds to pay such 
checks. The trial court and ·counsel understood such to be 
the issues to be heard at the second hearing and proceeded 
to try the case upon such understanding (Tr. Two, 4). 
Ho,vever, lest we are in error in such particular, we 
shall briefly answer some of the arguments contained in 
the brief of C.I.T. On page 9 of the brief filed on behalf 
of the C.I. T. it is said: 
"that the plaintiff bank cannot be exonerated by the 
stupidity or dereliction of its Vice-President nor should 
defendant be made to suffer for his stupidity." 
Counsel for C.I.T. seems to get considerable comfort 
out of name calling, but such practice does not strengthen 
the case of C.I.T. If Mr. Calder and Mr. Bird had been fa-
miliar wth and acquainted with Mr. McConnell, Mr. Sperry 
and Mr. Wilkenson and the readiness with which the C.I.T. 
repudiates the assurances of its officers and agents, it may 
be that they were stupid in relying on the assurances of Mr. 
M·cConnell when he said that drafts for which credit had 
been given on January 6. 1953, would be paid, and in rely-
ing on the assurances of Mr. McConnell and Mr. Sperry 
made on January 7, 1953, that the sight drafts that were 
then in Salt Lake would be paid, and in relying on the as-
surance of Mr. Wilkenson, also made on January 7, 1953. 
that he had seen some sight drafts at Salt Lake City which 
he had ordered paid. When these assurances were made 
plaint iff Bank could well have refused to pay the checks, 
but if we are in accord with the characterization given Cal-
d('r and Bird as being stupid, it must be because they be-
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lieved that the statements of the officers and agents of the 
C.I.T. could be relied upon even if the same were not in writ-
ing. There are many intelligent people who follow .the ex-
pression that his word is as good as his bond. 
It is not .clear just what is meant by the charge that 
the Vice-President of plaintiff Bank was derelict. It may be 
that Messrs. Calder and Bird were derelict in relying on the 
oral assurances of the officers and agents of the C.I.T., that 
the drafts would be and had been ordered paid until it was 
too late to refuse to pay the checks in controversy. The 
authorities generally, however, do not support the inference 
that the Bank owed a duty to keep C.I.T. informed as to the 
condition of the bank account of Parsley, Inc. The autho~ri­
ties are to the contrary. We are unable to find a case in 
Utah where that question has been decided, but we do find 
statutory provisions which indicate that public policy in this 
state is to the effect that the relation between a bank and 
its depositors is a confidential relation, and the bank may 
not reveal the condition of a depositor's account. 
Thus it is provided in U. C. A. 1953, 7-1-25, that: 
"None of such reports (of the Bank Commissioner) ex 
cept the published statements required by Section 7-
1-17 shall be deemed public records or be open for pub-
lic inspection without authorization from the reporting 
institution, and neither the bank commissioner nor any 
examiner, nor any person connected with his office, 
shall disclose ·any information obtained from any insti-
tution under his supervision to any person not connec-
ted with the state banking department." 
So also it is provided in U. C. A. 1953, 7-5-1, that a 1bank 
which undertakes to act as an executor or administrator is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
subject to the provisions relating to a trust company, and 
as such it is provided in U. C. A. 1953, 7-5-9, that it must: 
"keep inviolate all communications and writings made 
to or by said trust company touching the existence, 
condition, management and administration of any pri-
vate trust confided to it and no creditor or stockholder 
of any such trust company shall be entitled to disclosure 
or knowledge of any such communication or writing 
, 
It is said in 9 C. J. S. 555, Section 271(c), that "while 
a depositor has no proprietary interest in the records of a 
bank and cannot prevent their publication and proper care, 
he does have a proprietary right in the information con-
tained therein relative to the state of his account sufficient 
to place the bank under an implied duty to keep such rec-
ords secret as a general rule." 
The case of Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34. 104 N. J. Eq. 386, 
cited in the footnote to the text above quoted, holds that: 
"As respects the records of accounts, deposits and with-
drawals, a depositor has a proprietary right in the in-
formation contained therein and the bank is under an 
implied duty to keep the records from scrutiny unless 
compelled by a court of competent jurisdiction to do 
otherwise." 
In the case of Cunningham , .. Merchants Nat'I Bank 
of Man(~hester, 4 Fed. (2d) 25. 41 A.L.R. 529, certiorari de-
niPd, 2HR U. S. 691. it is held that banks are under no legal 
duty to \varn thP public as to the financial condition of their 
depositors. For other cases dealing \vith the relations of a 
bank to its depositors. in connection with revealing the con-
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dition of a depositor's account, we quote the following from 
the text at 7 C. J. 639: 
"The condition of a depositor's account is not to be dis-
closed to third persons, save for reasonable cause, as 
were required by order of court in some controversy 
where the state of a depositor's account becomes ma-
terial.'' 
A number of eases dealing with that matter are cited 
in Norte 71 to the Text. 
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Calder is that it 
is the uniform practice among bankers in Utah not to re-
veal the condition of a depositor's a-ccount without the con-
sent of the depositor (Tr. One, 125). 
If a bank should be required to go out of its way to in-
form those doing business with a depositor's account, then 
and in such ease the bank would undertake a hazardous 
venture. If the bank should be mistaken or draw an im-
proper conclusion, it might well be subject to substantial 
liability to the depositor for doing so. 
On page 3 of the brief of C.I.T. it is said that after the 
conversation had on December 24, 1952: 
"The plaintiff bank did, in fact, honor sight drafts for 
wholesaling in the total sum of $29,223.65, which de-
fendant refused to honor." 
Such statement is clearly in error, in that, all of the 
evidence is to the effect that of the $29,223.65 face value 
of the sight drafts honored by the Bank, four of the same 
of the face value of $3554.27 represented retail transactions 
even under the claim of C.I.T. as to what constitute a who~e­
sale and what a retail transaction (Tr. One, 228). All of the 
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discussion about the plaintiff giving credit for wholesale 
sight drafts loses all significance in light of the facts that 
C.I.T. treated all of the drafts alike, whether the same fell 
into the class whi:ch it chooses to call wholesale or retail. 
They were all dishonored at the same time. At no time 
has C.I.T. indicated that they were willing to pay any of 
the drafts, or reimburse plaintiff Bank for the money it paid 
on the checks drawn against the credit given for the drafts. 
Moreover, C.I.T. is under the same moral and legal ob-
ligation to reimburse plaintiff Bank for the money it paid 
out upon the assurance that the drafts had or would be 
paid, whether the same falls in the class characterized by 
C.I.T. as retail or wholesale drafts. So also are the prom-
ises made by the officers and agents of C.I.T., when it be-
came apparent that there would not be funds available to 
pay the outstanding checks here in controversy unless the 
drafts were honored and .paid, binding upon C.I.T. without 
regard to what may or may not have been said on December 
24, 1952. Such is the mandate of this Court, and appar-
ently the parties have had no difficulty in understanding 
the same. 
In the statement above cited from page 9 of the brief 
of C.I.T. mention is made of C.I.T. being made to suffer for 
his cupidity. If it is meant by such statement that C.I.T. 
will suffer because it gave credit for the drafts and paid the 
checks out of such credit, then and in such case, even if 
J?laintiff Bank should recover what it is here seeking, C.I.T. 
will be no worse off than it would have been if it had failed 
to give Parsley, Inc., credit for the dishonored drafts and 
refused to pay tbe checks for which it is he,re seeking to 
recover. If the plaintiff Bank recovers the amount it is 
sef'ldng to recover, C.I.T. will be entitled to a return of the 
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checks and thus be placed in the same position that it would 
have been in if plaintiff Bank had not given credit for the 
drafts and refused to pay the checks. 
On page 10 of the brief filed by C.I.T. it is said that it 
lost $70,710.00 by assuming that plaintiff's V1ice-President 
was an intelligent human being. Here again counsel for 
C.I.T. substitutes name calling for logic or argument. There 
was received in evidence Defendant's Exhi~bit 1, which is 
the record of the account of Harry Parsley, Inc., with plain-
tiff Bank during the entire time that he did business with 
the Bank. There is nothing in that account or elsewhere 
in the evidence which shows the amount that Parsley paid 
to C.I.T. The amount of credit given Parsley, Inc., 'by C.I.T. 
would be valueless without information as to the amount 
that Parsley, Inc., paid C.I.T. By authorizing plaintiff Bank 
to give immediate credit to Parsley, Inc., on sight drafts 
C.I.T. must have known that Parsley, Inc., was in need of 
funds. 
Moreover, even if there should be some evidence that 
Parsley, Inc., was given credit by C.I.T. which was not re-
paid, such fact does not aid in determimng the question of 
whether or n~t C.I.T. knew that Parsley was without funds 
in plaintiff Bank, if and when the drafts were dishonored. 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT KNOW AND IS NOT 
CHARGEABLE WITH KN·OWLEDGE THJAT PARSLEY, 
INC. DID NOT HAVE EN·OUGH FUNDS ON DEPOSIT 
TO PAY THE PARSLEY, INC. CHECKS EXHIBITS X 
THROUGH GG. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
·On page 18 of the brief filed on behalf of C.I.T. it is 
said: 
"that if there were any fraudulent statements made by 
defendant's agents, which it is impossible to show, it 
would be the statement by Wilkenson on January 7, 
1953. In this regard plaintiff is absolutely required to 
prove clearly, cogently and convincingly that: 1. Wil-
kenson made the statement, and 2. Plaintiff relied 
on it, and 3. Had a right to rely on it, and 4. It there-
by suffered damage." 
At the outset it must be kept in mind that the court 
below answered the above statement 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the 
affirmative. In the opinion heretofore written this Court 
in effect held that under the evidence then before the Court 
the trial court may so find. Not only is the evidence that 
was before the Court on the first hearing now before the 
Court, but there is considerable additional evidence received 
at the second hearing which materially tends to strengthen 
the Bank's case. We refer particularly to the evidence of 
the officers and agents of C.I.T., which shows that they had 
actual knowledge on January 6, and 7, 1953, that the Bank 
had refused to pay checks drawn by Parsley, Inc., in favor 
of C.I.T. We again call attention to the testimony of Calder 
that on January 6, 1953, Mr. McConnell called on long dis-
tance telephone and in a conversation then had stated that 
all drafts that were in process of clearance up to the close 
of business January 6, 1953, would be honored and paid 
(Tr. One. 51). That evidence stands uncontradicted. Again 
on January 7. 1953, at about 10:00 o'clock a. m., Mr. Sperry 
and Mr. Nichols called at the Bank and had a talk with Mr. 
Bird and Mr. Calder in which they stated the drafts that 
werP in process of clearance \vould be honored and paid 
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(Tr. One, 54 and 173). On the same day at aJbout 4 o'clock, 
after the bank was closed, Mr. Wilkenson came to the Bank 
and stated that there were drafts at Salt Lake which he had 
ordered paid (Tr. 176-177). What conceivable reason can 
there be for Messrs. McConnell, Sperry, Nichols and Wil· 
kenson insistence that the drafts would be paid unless they 
knew that there were no funds with which to pay the same 
except from the drafts, and why should the officers of the 
Bank be concerned about the drafts being paid except be-
cause they knew that there were no funds out of which the 
checks could be paid except the credit given for the sight 
drafts. Not only that, .but Mr. Sperry testified that Mr. 
Calder told him on January 7, 1953, that Parsley, Inc., had 
no funds to pay a check which he, Sperry, wished to have 
paid. Such refusal was made notwithstanding Sperry and 
Nichols assured the Bank that the drafts would be paid. 
We note that on page 19 of the brief of C.I.T. it is 
stated that: 
"For the plaintiff to argue as they do borders on in-
sanity.'' 
We again remark that name calling is not synonymous 
with logic or argument. 
Of course, if the argument of 'Counsel for the Bank 
"borders on insanity", by the same token the Findings of 
the court in conformity with such argument must fall in 
the same category. 
On page 13 of the brief of C.I.T. it is stated that the 
evidence fails to show that the checks couldn't have been 
sent out the same day that they were marked paid. Even 
if it be assumed that to be the fact, it is not made to appear 
what legal effect such a fact would have on the right of 
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the parties to this litigation. We assume it would have been 
possible to send the checks out the same day that credit was 
given. However, as the evidence shows the Bank had a 
right to take all of January 7, 1953, to 8 o'clock .p. m. to 
refuse payment of the checks (Tr. One, 193). See also 
U. C. A. 1953, 44-2-11. 
However, if the Bank paid the checks believing and 
relying on the assurance of C.I.T. that the drafts had been 
or would be honored and paid, it obviously is immaterial 
when the checks were paid. As to the question of whether 
or not the Bank paid the checks in ignorance of Parsley, 
Inc., being without funds to pay the checks, there would 
seem to be no basis for overruling the finding of the trial 
court. At no time did the Bank extend any credit to Pars-
ley, Inc., beyond the amount of the sight drafts. There is 
no evidence to the contrary. The most that can be said is 
that the Bank gave immediate credit for drafts drawn by 
Parsley, Inc. 
It may not be said that the Bank could not believe the 
repeated assurance of the officers of C.I.T. that the drafts 
would be paid. The failure to live up to such assurances 
was the cause of the lack of funds to pay the checks and 
the resulting damage to the Bank because the same were 
not honored and paid. 
POINT FOUR 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT REQUIRE THAT THE SUM OF $3554.27 MAY 
NOT LAWFULLY BE DEDUCTED FROM THE $24,668.03 
WIIICH THlE BANK PAID THE C.I.T. ON THE CHECKS 
DRAWN BY PARSLEY, INC., IN FAVOR OF C.I.T. AND 
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PAID .BY THE BANK IN RELIANCE UPON THE CRE-
DIT GIVEN PARSLEY FOR THE FOUR DISHONORED 
DRAFTS. 
We again direct the attention of the Court to this part 
of Findiilg No. 18 made at the conclusion of the first trial, 
(R. 64), and Finding No. 18 made at the conclusion of the 
second trial, (R. 109), which reads thus: . _ 
"That said note and mortgage were taken by the.plain-
tiff to protect itself and .other ~creditors and to prevent 
Harry Parsley, Inc., from disposing of its assets." 
That Finding refers to the note and mortgage which 
the plaintiff took from Parsley, Inc., as particularly found 
in the .fore part of the above mentioned paragraphs 18 made 
by the trial court at the conclusion of each of the two hear-
ings. 
In the course of the opinion heretofore written this 
Court held that unless the note and mortgage were given 
and received in payment of all or some of the obligations 
owing by Parsley, Inc., on the dishonored drafts, that plain-
tiff had a right to recover the same in this action. (See R. 
92). It will be noted that in the former appeal and on this 
appeal plaintiff has cross appealed from that part of the 
judgment deducting the $3554.27 from the j.udgment (R. 
78 and 122). So also has the Bank by its designation of the 
record to be brought up on its cross appeal b~ought that 
matter to this Court (R. 81 and 124). As to that item the 
evidence is the same on the second trial as it was on the 
first trial. That being so, the doctrine of the "Law of the 
case" is applicable and the Bank is entitled to have its judg-
ment increased to that amount, together with legal interest 
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thereon from and after the time C.I.T. received the money 
for the checks. 
POINT FIVE 
THlE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FINDING 
THAT THE BANK IMPOUNDED FROM THE ACCOUNT 
OF PARSLEY, INC., THE SUM OF $7792.57, OR ANY 
OTHER SUM, AND THEREFORE ERRED IN AMEND .. 
ING THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND IN DEDUCf ... 
ING FROM THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT THE 
SUM OF $7792.57, OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT. 
After the Court had made and filed its Findings of 
Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment after the last hear ... 
ing, the C.I.T. filed a Motion To Amend Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Contained in the Mo-
tion was a request to amend paragraph 31 by adding as a 
last phrase "and the sum of $7792.57, which sum was im-
pounded by plaintiff from the bank account of Parsley, Inc.,'' 
and by amending the Conclusions of Law so that the same 
should read that the 
"'Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant cor-
poration for the sum of $24,668.03 less the sum of 
$7792.57 it i~mpounded, less the sum of $3554.27 it sur-
rendered to Parsley, Inc., net judgment $13,319.19 to-
gether with interest at 6% per annum after January 
8, 19'53, and for costs." 
And to amend paragraph 1 of the Judgment to read: 
''That plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant 
corporation for the sum of $13,319.19 principal and 
$3196.56 interest to January 7, 1957, and costs of $44.40 
for a net judgment of $16,560.14 to January 7, 1957." 
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It is also stated that this motion is based upon mist.ake 
of mathematical computation orf principal and interest to 
be awarded to plaintiff in the above amount and is made 
pursuant to Rule 60(a) and (b) 1. (R. 117-118). Plain-
tiff filed a Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact setting 
forth the amount of money that was in the account of Pars-
ley, Inc., at the close of business on January 5, 19'53-, and 
thereafter up to and including January 10, 1H53 (R. 125 to 
126) . The Court made a Minute Order under date of Jan-
uary 31, 1957, in which the Motion made on behalf orf C.I.T. 
was granted, and the Motion made on behalf of the Bank 
was denied (R. 153). In the meantime and on January 19, 
1957, a Notiee of Appeal to this Court was filed on behalf 
of C.I.T. (R. 120). On January 21, 1957, the Bank filed a 
Cross Appeal from the judgment granting C.I.T. a set-off in 
the sum of $3554.27 from the judgment, (R. 124), and on 
February 27, 1957, the Bank filed an Amended Notice of 
Appeal wherein it appealed from the judgment allowing a 
set-off in the sum of $3554.27, and also the Minute OrdeT 
made on or about January 31, 1957 (R. 127). 
It will be seen that the Motion made by the Bank to 
Amend the Findings of Fact was calculated merely to make 
the same to conform in greater detail to the statement of 
the account of Parsley, Inc., with the Bank as contained in 
defendant's Exhibit 1. Plaintiff'·s Exhibit V, the checks 
marked Plaintiff's Exhibits DD, EE, FF, GG, CC, BB, AA, 
Z, Y and X, the same being the checks paid out of the credit 
given Parsley for the dishonored drafts. All of the drafts 
that were dishonored and marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, 
G, H and I are reflected in the bank account, marked De-
fendant's Exhibit 1 and Plaintiff's Exhibit V. The fom 
drafts that were returned t9 Parsley, Inc., are also reflected 
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in the record just mentioned. Those Exhibits are in accord 
with. the testi~mony of Mr. Calder (Tr. One, 23, et seq.). We 
·can find no evidence which detracts in the slightest degree 
from the accuracy of the Exhibits, nor of the fact that credit 
was given for the same as testified to by Mr. Calder. 
It will be seen that on January 6, 1953, there was de-
posi.ted to the Harry Parsley, Inc., account the sum of $31,-
350.12, and on the same day numerous checks were cashed 
so that at the end of business on January 6, 1953, there was 
a credit of $1724.54. At the close of business on January 
7, 1953, there was a credit of $6884.44 On January 9, 1953, 
$6874.44 and on January 10, 1953, there was a credit in the 
account of Parsley, Inc., in the sum of $7792.57, the sa.nie 
being the amount that the trial court held was impounded 
and the additional amount that the trial court deducted from 
the judgment. It will be noted that the account of Parsley, 
Inc., became comparatively inactive after January 7, 1953. 
That was doubtless brought about by the fact that on Janu-
ary 8, 1953, plaintiff Bank was informed that the drafts 
were dishonored. There was a check for $10.00 paid on 
January 9, 1953, and on January lOth, which was the day 
the dishonored drafts were returned to the Bank, there was 
a deposit of $3500.00, and a check for $2581.87 was charged 
against Parsley, Inc., account. That was a check which 
C.I.T. had given to Parsley, Inc., and which Parsley, Inc., 
had deposited to its account and which C.I.T. has refused 
to honor, and upon its being returned to the Bank the same 
was charged against the Parsley, Inc., account. (See Plain-
tiff's Exhibit II). The evidence shows without conflict that 
the $7792.57 was on Janary 10, 1953, deducted from the 
Parsley Account and applied to the reduction of the credit 
which the Bank had given Parsley, Inc., accow1t for the 
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dishonored .drafts. It will be recalled that the total amount 
of the dishonored drafts. was $29,223.65, less $7792.57, leav-
ing a balance of $21,431.08, which is the amount which plain-
tiff seeks to recover. It may be noted that in both of the 
Findings made by the trial court it was found that the 
amount of the dishonored sight drafts was $29,223.65, and 
that the court found that the swn of $7792.57 was deducted 
from the amount of the credit given to Parsley for the sight 
dra!ts. (See paragraph 17, page 64 of the Findings at the 
conclusion orf the ·first appeal, and paragraph 17, (R. 108), 
at the conclusion of the second appeal). 
At the risk· of again being referred to, as is done on 
page 19 of the brief of C.I~T., as making an argument that 
"borders on insanity", we confess that we are at a loss to 
understand what the Court meant when it said the $7792.57 
was ~'impounded'' and ·should be deducted from the amount 
of the judgment. Not only does the evidence, the Findings 
of the trial court, but counsel for C.I.T. in its 'brief on page 
3 thereof said that the total of the dishonored drafts (in-
correctly referred to as being all wholesale drafts) for which 
credit was given amounted to $29,2.23.65, and that the les-
ser sum of $21,431.08 was "arrived at as a result of an off-
set the bank had em funds of Parsley in the bank that were 
impounded by plaintiff''. Among the definitions given to 
the word "impounded" is to hold in the custody of the law. 
If the application of the $7792.57 in reducing the amount 
~f credit given to Parsley on · account of the dishonored 
checks constitutes an impounding of· such money, then the 
same was impounded. Without regard to what meaning 
is given the word impounded, the important matter here 
presented is: Should the judgment against C.I.T. be re-
duced $7792.57 because the Bank applied the $7792.57 to 
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drafts had been dishonored? It is the position of the Bank 
that it was not only authorized to so apply the $7792.57 for 
that purpose, but that it was its duty to do so. Moreover, 
C.I.T. is in no position to complain, because if the $7792.57 
had not been so applied, the amount recoverable from C.I.T. 
would have been larger. If the Bank had permitted Parsley 
to withdraw the.$7792.57, there would, of course, have been 
no money to reduce the amount of checks here in contro-
versy, the total of which is $24,668.03. Thus, why should 
C.I.T. get a second reduction of the judgment when it has 
already been benefitted by the so-called impounding of the 
$7792.57 .. Of course, Parsley, Inc., was obligated to reim-
burse the Bank for the credit given for the dishonored drafts. 
Moreover, the authorities teach that a bank in the ab-
sence of an agreement to the contrary has a right to apply~ 
a deposit to the payment of a debt· due it by the depositor. 
7 Am. Jur., page 455, Section 629. The law in such ~particu­
lar seems to be the uniform holding of the courts as will 
be seen from the cases cited in the footnote to the text. 
It may be noted that the evidence including Plaintiff's 
Exhibit V shows that some money was received by the Bank 
and credited to Parsley after the account was closed on Jan-
uary 10, 195,7. 'f>hat money, however, was collected after 
Parsley,, Inc., was thrown into bankruptcy, and, therefore, 
the Bank must account to the Bankruptcy Court for that 
money. 
It is submitted that Farmers and Merchants Bank is 
entitled to a judgment against the Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corporation for the full amount prayed for in its Amended 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
Complaint and prays that this Court direct the Court below 
to enter such a judgment, and for costs. 
Respectfully submited, · 
J. RULO'N MORGAN 
and 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Farmers and Merchants Bank 
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